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ABSTRACT  
The rapid evolution of radio technology into the software defined era, has 
accelerated the availability of advanced radio receivers that can cover very large 
portions of the radio spectrum (70MHz to 6GHz) at low cost. Coupled with the 
democratisation of knowledge that has occurred through the internet, the threat 
environment for Electronic Warfare (EW) has changed markedly over the last 5 
years. Previously EW threat would have arisen from a state actor that could fund 
the expensive equipment and antenna arrays that would be required for the 
intercept and disruption of military signals activities. Instead it is now possible to 
download freely available software to launch EW attacks on widely publicised 
radio link standards. 
The aim of this research is to explore the security of wireless communication 
systems when exposed to threats generated by Software Defined Radios (SDR). 
The research is aimed at exploring this vulnerability due to the rapidly decreasing 
cost and the lowering of skill barriers to launch advanced EW attacks on wireless 
communication systems.  
The first objective was to understand what current knowledge exists on the EW 
threat on the RF environment, allowing an understanding of this advanced threat 
against wireless infrastructure. The literature review has showed that the 
vulnerabilities of wireless networks are in existence and there are potential 
methods of protection that have been studied, although these protection 
schemes do not seem to have been implemented in production quality systems.  
The second objective is to validate this prognosis against a test bed, constructed 
as a threat source that could be typical of a hobbyist or script kiddie, allowing two 
threat scenarios to be demonstrated, validating the threat source. This research 
included the execution of two laboratory based attacks against wireless systems, 
namely a record and replay attack against the Personal Role Radio (PRR) and a 
Meaconing attack against GPS. These experiments showed that a flexible 
Vulnerability Analysis test bed can be assembled to conduct Vulnerability 
Investigation against wireless standards. Specifically, this also showed the 
Vulnerability of the PRR radio against record and replay attacks. 
Keywords: Cyber Security; Software Defined Radio; Waveform Vulnerability; Threat 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aims and Objectives  
The aim of this research is to explore the security of wireless communication 
systems when exposed to threats generated by Software Defined Radios (SDR). 
The research is aimed at exploring the ability for SDR platforms to counter 
common wireless network security mechanisms for link layer protection. This 
research has been targeted at answering two specific objectives: 
The first is a systematic threat characterisation using detailed literature review. 
This is documented within Chapter 3 and explores the historical context to 
understand the current threat to the wireless link layer and the current published 
research into countering these vulnerabilities from intercept, jamming and 
spoofing. This includes academic sources as well as sources from within the 
Hacking community. 
The second is a threat validation experiment which sought to validate two specific 
link layer threat scenarios that explore the ability of record replay and meaconing 
attacks to disrupt wireless networks. These scenarios exploit the availability and 
performance of commercially available Software Defined Radio platforms that 
are available for the hobbyist and researcher. To complete this, a dedicated test 
bed was set up replicating the equipment and software that a low capability 
Hacker may have at their disposal.  
1.2 Context  
This research is being carried out within the context of an ever increasing 
integration of mobile computing elements within the United Kingdom’s (UK) 
System of Systems (SoS). This architecture is providing ever more accessibility 
to data and Internet Protocol (IP) bearers to deliver critical information to decision 
makers. This is in parallel with the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT), which is 
interconnecting previously innocuous sensing technology to the Internet, in order 
to provide value added services to the wider community. As the IoT grows, it is 
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researchers and hackers alike. This may see a widening of EW style attacks 
being used against civilian infrastructure by non-state actors1. 
These seemingly disparate applications will face common vulnerabilities to the 
passage of wireless data. Wireless systems are vulnerable to a multitude of 
attack vectors that if used against wired networks would require some level of 
physical access to that network to conduct. For instance, wireless networks are 
vulnerable to the injection of inconsistent or incorrect data, man in the middle 
attacks against the system integrity (eavesdropping), or simple jamming to deny 
the availability of the system.   
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks against websites is 
prevalent on the Internet, causing disruption for organisations, either through the 
disruption of revenue in the case of an on-line store, or the reduction in credibility. 
Examples of this have already been reported within the UK. (Dunn, 2013) is a 
published report from a study by the UK Technology Strategy Board, where up 
to 100 GPS jamming events a day were identified to be originating from van 
drivers that have purchased illegal, but commercially available GPS jamming 
devices to stop their vans being tracked by employers. Searches of the Internet 
(jammer4uk, 2015) show how rapidly GPS, Wi-Fi and cellular jammers can be 
purchased and illegally operated.  
Current wireless protocols and waveforms for civilian infrastructure such as 
802.11 do not include protection against Jamming or Spoofing. Instead the 
wireless security is solely aimed at protecting the confidentiality of the data. As 
society becomes increasingly reliant on wireless communications to undertake 
our critical tasks such as banking, access to assets and handling medical data, 
the vulnerability of current security mechanisms will be pushed and increasingly 
exploited.  
The same issues and threat mechanisms that are being explored within civilian 
implementations have been the focus of militaries since the days of World War 
1.  Militaries implemented cryptography to protect confidentiality swiftly followed 
by the implementation of techniques to conceal and obscure their wireless 
transmissions. It may be time where these techniques are considered for 
                                               
1 Non-state actors relates to threat sources that do not originate from the control of a nation state. 
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commercial systems. The tension between the publishing of standards openly 
along with the requirement of ubiquitous interoperability are counter to the 
principles of obscuring and securing wireless transmissions, ensuring the cycle 
of vulnerability and counter measures will continue for the foreseeable future. 
1.3 Exclusions 
This research was conducted using open source information sources and 
subscription based research journals. The MOD and Dstl (the UK MOD’s 
research and development organisation responsible for the research and 
development of sensitive technology directly related to use by the MOD) have 
not contributed source material, in order to ensure this work is able to be openly 
publishable. Initial email discussions with Dstl has provided direct input to the 
direction of this research.  
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This thesis has been structured in order to outline the threat under which wireless 
networks operate as well as enumerating that threat and demonstrating example 
threat vectors.  
Section 2 – Fundamentals of wireless security introduces the threat vectors 
that wireless networks are vulnerable to. This outlines the concepts of Information 
Assurance, Security and vulnerability in order to provide the fundamentals that 
the Systematic Threat Survey is conducted. 
Section 3 – Systematic Threat Survey uses the literature in order to outline the 
known vulnerabilities to wireless networks. This covers all of the vectors as 
described within Section 2. The Threat Survey also catalogues some advanced 
mitigation techniques that have been identified as potentially beneficial in 
mitigating the identified vulnerabilities.  
Section 4 – Methodology explains the summarised threat and defines the 
experimental construct as explored within Section 5. Section 4 outlines the test 
bed setup and the limitations imposed on the experimentation. 
Section 5 – Results and analysis, explores the results from the experimentation 
conducted, this includes the two threat vectors explored, Record and Replay 
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Section 6 – Conclusion and future work concludes the thesis, within this 
section the conclusions arising from the experimental work along with its impact 
and recommendations for future exploration are made.  
1.5 Contribution 
Given the ubiquitous nature of modern digital transmission, and the threat from 
intercept and spoofing, more protection is required to prevent demodulation or 
even identification of these signals. Although encryption techniques such as 
ULTRA and SSL are technically very hard to crack under brute force attack, the 
common fact is that human imperfections in the implementation of that encryption 
has led to their vulnerabilities.  
This leads to a fundamental conclusion that the physical wireless signal requires 
a new technique to either mask it or to prevent a third party from being able to 
de-modulate it. There appears to be no lack of viable protection schemes within 
the literature. Instead seemingly what is required is a commercial drive to 
implement a new generation of wireless protocols, enabling secure exchanges 
of information. With vulnerabilities relating to the introduction to Vehicle to 
Infrastructure, Vehicle to Vehicle or simply ad-hoc connections, the requirement 




Page 13 of 71 
2 FUNDAMENTALS OF WIRELESS SECURITY 
2.1 Introduction 
Before the specific threats to wireless security are explored, a definition of the 
threat vectors is required. This section explores the principles of wireless security 
and the potential threat vectors that exist for these systems along with the threat 
environment in which they operate.  
2.2 Principles of Wireless Security  
Security of electronic systems, whether wireless or wired can be attained to three 
different factors; the Confidentiality, Integrity or Availability of the information that 
is being either processed, communicated or stored.  
2.2.1 Three modes of protection 
The Confidentiality relates to protection of private information from an 
unauthorised third party. This can be related to the encryption of either the 
transport layer or payload within a production system. Technologies such as 
Secure Sockets Layer protect the confidentiality of data and is implemented 
within the transport layer as defined by the (ISO/IEC, 1989) Open System 
Interconnection (OSI) 7-layer model. This encryption can also occur within the 
Application and Presentation layers, dependant on the application under 
analysis. 
Integrity is the assurance that the data received by an end system is unaltered 
by a third party. Typically, cryptographic authentication mechanisms can be used 
to protect systems against attacks surrounding their integrity. These may either 
take the form of message authentication codes or digital signatures, which use 
one-way cryptographic hashing to produce a unique code based on a shared 
secret key. This should not be confused with the use of Cyclic Redundancy 
Checks (CRC) as a mitigation for data corruption. CRC’s are vulnerable to 
exploitation as they are normally based upon a linear stream cypher. This has 
been exploited to crack Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) that was used to protect 
early WiFi networks.  
Availability relates to the presence of the signal or system to continue to deliver 
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cause clock synchronisation drift in systems where time synchronicity is a key 
control element, denying the systems prime purpose – for instance a 
cryptographic identity server protecting system logon requests.  
An adversary may choose to use one, two or all three of these attack vectors in 
order to produce disruption for a targeted system. When relating these vectors to 
wireless systems, their broadcast nature can be interpreted as leaving them 
incredibly vulnerable to any of these attacks.  
The three mechanisms of security are countered by three mechanisms of attack: 
Interception, Spoofing and Jamming.  
2.2.2 The three mechanism of attack 
Interception seeks to extract the information being communicated by a system, 
whether it’s the digital payload or an analogue encoded voice message. 
Interception normally requires the third party to extract the information without 
affecting the integrity of the signal in question, however within a wireless system 
this is not required as passive techniques can be used to de-modulate and de-
code the signal of interest without the target being aware. Due to this, it is difficult 
to detect an intercept attack that is in progress on a wireless network. These 
attacks can be carried out against the prime Radio Frequency (RF) emanations 
or against the unintentional RF emanations from electronics, a practice that has 
been given the code name of TEMPEST by western governments.  
 
Figure 1 - Wireless Intercept 
Spoofing typically involves injecting crafted packets into wireless systems 
causing either subtle effects, for instance an increase in Bit Error Rate (BER), or 
bulk errors in data. One of the most prominent examples of spoofing is the 
corruption of Global Positioning System (GPS) location data. Recent sources 
(Christian Science Monitor , 2011) have indicated that downing of a USA 
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spoofing activity, however this has not been officially confirmed by the US air 
force. 
The detection of spoofing events is feasible due to the active nature of the signal 
injection; however, a well-crafted spoof attack leaves no residual signature after 
the attack.  
 
Figure 2 - Spoofing 
 
Jamming is the process of injecting noise into a RF channel in order to deny its 
availability. There are various jamming techniques varying from Barrage, which 
indiscriminately blocks single or multiple radio channels; Reactive, which seeks 
to stay silent until the target waveform is detected; or protocol, where the protocol 
layer of the wireless signal is interfered with to disrupt its operation. Jamming 
attacks by their nature are noisy and easy to detect, however when conducted 
with sufficient power they are difficult to counter, unless the target systems has 
sufficient RF bandwidth that spreads the signal past the capabilities of the 
jammer. Jamming although easily identifiable is the easiest attack vector against 
wireless networks not requiring fundamental knowledge of the target waveform. 
Distributed and co-ordinated jammers have the potential for blocking access to 
wireless services over a large area. If applied to a service such as Tetra in the 
UK, could remove access to primary Blue Light emergency communications for 
a local area.  
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2.3 The Wireless Threat Environment 
The nature of electromagnetic propagation ensures that when a wireless signal 
such as a Wi-Fi network, Personal Mobile Radio (PMR) or car remote key fob is 
used, it is not solely directed to the intended recipient, instead it is broadcast 
openly and is limited only by the rules of physics and the interplay of the physical 
waveform and its surrounding environment.  
Given these constructs, equipment such as Low Noise Amplifiers, Directional 
Antennas and signal processing techniques can allow an adversary to recover 
signals far beyond their intended range. This ensures that no wireless 
transmission can ever be regarded as private and confidential. Given the 
increasing amount of personal data relating to banking, safety of life2 being 
transmitted via wireless networks, the requirement to protect against an 
adversary increases.  
Protection mechanisms exist to increase the protection of a systems 
Confidentiality, Integrity or Availability, however the cycle of protection 
mechanism and eventual defeat via threat technology3 is testament to the 
continued vulnerability of these systems.  
The wireless threat environment used to be restricted to those that possessed 
specialist knowledge and expensive equipment. These were normally Radio 
Ham operators who had access to limited equipment or Governmental/ Military 
specialists who had access to both complex equipment and the training in order 
to conduct these attacks. Developments of Bits to RF direct conversion, enabling 
a new generation of cheap Software Defined Radios have removed these 
limitations in terms of access to technology, and the Internet has democratised 
the access to knowledge leaving a potent mixture of enhanced risks that wireless 
networks are now exposed to. Given the ubiquitous nature and the sensitivity and 
safety in relation to data that is now passed over these connections, threats that 
were once related only to a military operation are now potential attack vectors 
that should be taken into account within civilian infrastructure. 
                                               
2 Such as emergency medical assistance, medical device connectivity or protective monitoring. 
3 Threat technology relates to any technology that defeats a security mechanism, this could be 
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2.4 Impact from the loss of Wireless Communications Security 
and Integrity 
The premise of this thesis was based upon the understanding and experience of 
threats to wireless networks within the Defence and Security environment. It is 
easy to understand that within this environment there is a direct correlation 
between the vulnerability of a wireless system and its impact on the safety of 
persons.  
Within the Defence environment, wireless systems are used to pass information 
relating to the command and control of specific military capability. This could be 
a formation of troops, vehicles or large platforms such as a Submarine, Ship or 
Aircraft. These communication systems have been well protected in order to 
ensure their continued operation when under attack from a third party, preventing 
disruption to their operation. In this scenario it is perceivable that a vulnerability 
within the wireless connection could lead to a fire control order being erroneously 
raised, prior knowledge of an attack being gained or even direct control of a 
remote weapon system.  
(Christian Science Monitor , 2011) has reported on real world examples where 
the Predator drone video downlink had been intercepted and used by insurgent 
actors in order to gain an understanding of the Predator operations against them. 
This relied on intercepting and decoding the signal that was being used by 
forward deployed soldiers to watch insurgent activity.  
What hasn’t been so clear has been the direct impact form these form of attacks 
on Civilian infrastructure, systems and services. Technology developments such 
as the Internet of Things, Vehicle to Vehicle, Vehicle to Infrastructure and 
Autonomous Vehicles will drive towards an increasing role of wireless 
communications that support safety critical services. These services could have 
direct impact on safety of life.  Aside from these new developments, services 
such as Tetra, GPS and rail signalling all are based upon wireless standards that 
could be compromised and provide a real threat to life and safety if exploited. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Given the broadcast nature of wireless networks, they face a wider scope of 
attack vectors than physically cabled networks. This is a factor that has been 




Page 18 of 71 
networks are increasingly relied upon for day to day life, so will these networks 
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3 SYSTEMATIC THREAT SURVEY 
3.1 Introduction 
This systematic threat survey has been written in order to place into historical 
context the threats that wireless networks face. This uses the military history of 
attacking wireless networks to demonstrate the evolution of protective measures, 
followed by an examination of typical and known vulnerabilities in key Civilian 
infrastructure. Lastly it covers research that has been conducted into the 
protection of systems, covering some new and novel approaches that could be 
used to counter the threats explored.  
3.2 Historical Discussion of Wireless Vulnerabilities 
Since the use of wireless communications technology within the military 
environment, the intercept of these communications and the use of intelligence 
arising has provided valuable advantages. (Bartholomew, 2002, 2006) 
documents the advent of electronic interception of wireless communications as 
early as the Boer Wars (1900), where the Royal Navy used early Marconi 
wireless sets in the late 1890’s along with the British Army’s use of some limited 
wireless communications. The Boers used captured British radio sets to transmit 
vital information, which was intercepted by the British forces. 
The first properly documented examples of significant use of Wireless Intercept 
was prior to and during World War 1. The National Security Agency (NSA) (USA 
agency responsible for Signals Intelligence (SIGNT) and Information Assurance 
(IA)) has published papers on the history of wireless intercept. One paper, 
(Flicke, 1954) explores the early use of intercept from the perspective of a 
German intelligence officer. This paper describes clearly the military and political 
advantage that is sought and won through the intercept of sensitive 
communications. Since these early examples, most nations have taken part in 
these activities. Famously Winston Churchill was reported to have told King 
George VI “"It is thanks to the secret weapon of General Menzies, put into use 
on all the fronts, that we won the war!" further to this, Sir Harry Hinsley (Hinsley, 
1996) argued that Ultra4 shortened the war "by not less than two years and 
                                               
4 Ultra was the designation adopted by British military intelligence in June 1941 for wartime 
signals intelligence obtained by breaking high-level encrypted enemy radio and tele-printer 




Page 20 of 71 
probably by four years"; and that, “in the absence of Ultra, it is uncertain how the 
war would have ended”. 
In the years since World War 2, Military communications security has developed 
in order to minimise the risk of intercept and successful decoding of the contents. 
During and following World War 2, up to the 1980’s, the British military relied on 
the Slidex manual cypher system (Kruth, 1984), which was replaced with the 
Battle Code (BATCO) paper based cypher system, eventually replaced in 2010 
by the secure Bowman communications system.  
The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) command and control systems have become 
increasingly interconnected over the last 15 years via the introduction of Network 
Enabled Capability (NEC) doctrine and technology development, around the time 
of the second Gulf War (2003). Since this advent Military doctrine has shifted 
towards being network rather than platform centric, allowing a modern military to 
maintain Information Superiority, the ability to get the right information to the right 
people at the right time. In order to achieve this, the adoption and exploitation of 
digital data services were central to the roll out and establishment of modern 
Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities.  Early NEC enabling systems such as 
Bowman and the US Secure Channel Ground-Air Radio System (SINCGARS) 
relied on waveform security and secure encryption of data payloads in order to 
resist electronic intercept. The waveform security is generally provided by 
frequency hopping behaviours that continually change the transmission 
frequency based upon either a pre-determined look-up table or a proprietary 
algorithm. These behaviours are classified as having the properties of a Low 
Probability of Intercept (LPI) or Low Probability of Detect (LPD). The frequency 
hopping characteristics, along with nation specific encryption modules5 provide a 
very secure means of communications, resistant to intercept and decoding.  
During recent operations (Operation TELLIC6 and Operation HERRICK7) the UK 
forces have operated within differing circumstances and facing a different threat 
to what existed during the Cold War. During Operations TELLIC and HERRICK, 
                                               
5 UK CESG Developed Pritchell II or USA NSA developed WALBURN, PADSTONE or WEASEL  
6 Codename for the United Kingdom’s military operations in Iraq between 19 March 2003 and 22 
May 2011 
7 Codename for the United Kingdom’s military operations in Afghanistan between 20 June 2002 
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threats faced by UK forces were asymmetric in nature and assumed to be lacking 
an Electronic Warfare element due to the lack of a nation state adversary. On 
this backdrop of threat and extended operations, the integration of services have 
evolved within UK and Coalition8 operations to a point that data can reach from 
the UK Joint Forces HQ all the way forward to a theatre of operations, and even 
down to deployed individual sub-units via the Bowman communications system 
and its integration with high level communications such as Falcon and Reacher. 
This integration has been achieved by the increasing adoption of commercial 
standards and equipment in order to bring into service high bandwidth 
communications and interoperability between systems for Operation HERRICK.  
Reporting by the international press highlighted the relative vulnerabilities that 
were appearing in US communications systems through the use of un-encrypted 
communications due to either complacency to threat or through the rapid 
deployment and evolution of capability such as the Predator Remotely Piloted Air 
System (RPAS) (Noah Shachtman, 2012). This vulnerability was exploited by 
insurgent forces to monitor the live feeds of Predators operating over Iraq. No 
publicly attributable data exists on how this may have affected operations, 
however at a minimum the insurgents would have been able to understand the 
Electro-Optic (EO) Surveillance capabilities, the techniques and tactics of ground 
forces being directed, surveillance patterns etc. This vulnerability was exploited 
through the use of a commercially available satellite TV decoder9 and receiving 
interface. Over the preceding years the US military have rapidly fielded encrypted 
and hardened waveforms for the predator fleet in order to counter this specific 
threat.  
These threat vectors, although seemingly specific to a military environment, have 
direct applicability to the Internet of Things (IoT). The IoT can be described as 
the proposed development of the Internet in which everyday objects have 
network connectivity, allowing them to send and receive data – primarily via 
wireless mechanisms.  The IoT as well as developments for Vehicle to 
Infrastructure (V2i) and Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) communications that enable 
next generation capabilities such as autonomous behaviours are currently 
vulnerable to wireless link layer attacks. These include demodulation and the 
cracking of encryption, all classical attacks that previous generation military 
                                               
8 ISAF – International Security Assistance Force, NATO lead coalition for security in Afghanistan 
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systems were hardened against. The vulnerability of these wireless 
communication systems is being tested by hackers. Lessons that have seemingly 
been unlearnt within military communications may potentially provide answers to 
the future of securing the IoT against a range of attackers, ranging from the 
seemingly benign through to the malicious. 
3.3 Threat Device Accessibility 
“The power of choosing good and evil is within the reach of all.” Origen 
Since the conclusion of the Cold war (1945 – 1990) militaries such as the UK 
army have not faced a formal Electronic Warfare threat to tactical system. This, 
coupled with the rise of integrated computing systems that have gateway access 
to the Internet have refocused threat assessments and risk mitigations toward 
Cyber vulnerabilities including Malware, Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) 
rather than the hostile act of locating, de-modulating and intercepting the 
communications on a wireless connection. This, however, will change with the 
advent and commercialisation of advanced Software Defined Radios (SDR’s). 
Software Defined Radio, has its origins in work conducted by the US Department 
of Defence in the 1970’s with the term Software Radio established in 1984 by a 
team of engineers working for a division of E-Systems (Johnson, 1985). This 
original concept gained traction with various US governmental agencies, from 
which the modern SDR programmes have developed.  
The United States of America’s Department of Defence has had several 
programmes to develop SDR technology towards practical use from these early 
days. Specifically, the SPEAKeasy programme was developed to demonstrate 
the practical use of SDR for the air force that could tune in a range between 2MHz 
to 2GHz, allowing the integration of Ground, Air, Naval and Satellite radios. From 
this basis the SDR has gained momentum and is forming the basis of Military 
radio architectures including the US Joint Tactical Radio System. 
SDR themselves establish elements of the analogue radio receiver in software, 
allowing the designer to establish flexible radio designs. Prior to the 
establishment of SDR platforms, a radio (once designed) was generally fixed in 
function until a circuit modification was conducted to re-purpose the receiver 
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Relatively recent System on Chip solutions from companies such as Lime Micro 
Systems10 and Analogue Devices, offer direct Radio Frequency to digital 
interfaces. These chipsets provide a very wide RF front end (typically KHz – GHz) 
with RF bandwidth ranges of between 50 and 150MHz.  These products, when 
integrated with a powerful Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) and Digital 
Signal Processing (DSP) produce a powerful SDR platform.  
Companies such as Nuand and Ettus research have developed commercially 
available implementations that can be integrated with open source software 
platforms such as GNU Radio and GQRX in order to provide a functioning SDR 
solution.  
These provide a low cost and wide bandwidth capability that can be used to 
survey a very large portion of the electromagnetic spectrum instantaneously. The 
pricing of these devices range from as little as £19 up to as high as £6000. 
(NooElec, 2015) This removes the barriers of cost for access to high performance 
radio receivers (Jones, June 2012) that previously kept this capability out of the 





Bandwidth FPGA Retail Price 






card and X310 
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3.2 MHz NA £19 
Table 1 Commercially available Software Defined Radios 
The SDR’s presented within Table 1 are all compatible with GNU radio11, which 
is an open-source software development toolkit that provides signal processing 
blocks to implement software radios. GNU radio provides a relatively easy 
graphical work flow interface in order to programme SDR platforms. This toolkit 






Page 24 of 71 
allows SDR applications to be created either through the use of a graphical flow 
chart or to be written in Python.  
During a presentation to Defcon 21 (Defcon 21, 2013) Balint Seeber recognised 
a comprehensive overview of the possibilities of using GNU radio along with an 
Ettus Research USRP SDR platform for intercepting and decoding a wide variety 
of radio protocols. Using GNU radio as a signals intelligence toolkit, Balint was 
able to intercept Mode S IFF transponders, 2G GSM, 802.11agp, Automatic 
Identification System (AIS), Aircraft Communications, Addressing and Reporting 
System (ACARS) along with the automatic toll payment system FasTrak. The 
presentation of this research to a wide community of security researchers and 
self-proclaimed Hackers, started an increased interest in what a SDR can be 
used for and what systems could be compromised via the use of traditional EW 
and SIGINT techniques. The presentation of these techniques and wide 
availability of source information via the Internet could be seen as a lowering of 
the technical barrier for these attacks. Since the Defcon 21 presentation, 
intercept software for AIS and ADSB intercept as shown in Figure 4 and Figure 
5 is widely available and easy to install for an unexperienced enthusiast, allowing 
them to track all commercial shipping traffic within the local area, and using the 
Internet to identify individual vessels along with information surrounding their 
route and cargo. 
 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged 
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Figure 4 : ACARS intercept as presented by Balint Seeber 
 
Figure 5 Raw ACARS messages decoded by open source software and a RTL-SDR SDR 
dongle 
As can be seen modern SDR platforms are highly capable and with software 
such as GNU radio available, provide a very capable threat source to all wireless 
networks. This threat can be characterised in two distinct ways:  
 Intercept – the capture and decode (by a third party) of messages 
transmitted between two other parties.  
 Jamming – the prevention of wireless transfers either through the use of in 
band RF noised, swamping the Signal to Noise Ratio of the Receiver or 
conduct an attack at a protocol level, inhibiting the data transfer.  
(Jones, June 2012) argues that as most radio systems are deployed without 
physically testing the vulnerability of the link layer, it is probable that many 
wireless systems have been deployed with an inherent vulnerability due to miss-
configuration.  
This is relevant outside of the Military domain as systems such as Vehicle to 
Vehicle, Vehicle to Infrastructure, Industrial Control, Security and CCTV and 
Critical National Infrastructure will have a common vulnerability and attack 
vectors due to the use of wireless and openly published protocols. 
The following sections explore these two methods and the existing research 
surrounding the generation and protection against these methods of wireless 
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3.4 Threat Vectors 
3.4.1 What is the threat from intercept? 
SDR’s are a threat to the RF transport layer previously thought only to be 
vulnerable to either a very well trained third party equipped with a large Electronic 
Warfare capability or a stolen radio receiver from the intended target. SDR 
products such as the Ettus Research E310 along with GNU radio12 now allow 
people with little Radio Frequency (RF) engineering experience (described as 
‘script kiddies13’ within the hacking community) can undertake interception of 
complex radio platforms such as Tetra (RTL-SDR, 2014) or ACARS (RTL-SDR 
admin, 2013) via a download of plugins for the GNU radio platform. Largely these 
intercepts are achieved due to the reverse engineering of known protocols and 
the use of the SDR to provide a wide bandwidth and high speed receiver. This 
highlights vulnerabilities in systems that provide a portion of the UK’s Critical 
National Infrastructure (CNI) to intercept by a third party. Internet sources 
highlight that this has been achieved in the UK against live TETRA systems 
(Shadow, 2013), but it is unclear what TETRA users (Ofcom, 2015) have been 
targeted or how much information was retrieved from the system.  
3.4.1.1 ERTMS and GSM Vulnerability to Intercept 
Further to the availability of intercept software for trunked radio systems, recent 
research conducted on the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) 
has shown that it is vulnerable to Cyber threats (Pultarova, 2015). In fact it 
appears to be vulnerable from electronic intercept from SDR, due to the use of 
GSM-R (derivative of GSM) bearer for trackside communications. Figure 6 
(Banedanmark, 2008) illustrates the protocol specification for GSM-R, 
highlighting the implementation of the standard GSM protocol, suggesting that 
GSM-R may be vulnerable to the same link layer security vulnerabilities within 
GSM.  
                                               
12 www.gnuradio.org 
13 A person who uses existing computer scripts or codes to hack into computers, lacking the 
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Figure 6 GSM-R protocol specification taken from (Banedanmark, 2008) 
Several websites are available that show this vulnerability of GSM to intercept 
and decoding (Casanovas, n.d.) provides clear instructions on how this can be 
achieved, and provides step by step instructions on how to create a capable 
setup. (Gold, April 2011) explores the recent (since 2003) rapid circumvention of 
security within the GSM standard.  
Several high profile security researchers such as Chris Paget (Defcon 18, 
November 2013) have demonstrated practical man in the middle attacks against 
the GSM standard via IMSI catching. During this attack, GSM handsets attach to 
a malicious base station and transfer all data and call traffic through the malicious 
base station, allowing intercept. Work by Karsten Nohl of Security Research Labs 
and Sylvian Munaut of OsmcommBB presented further enhancements on 
Paget’s work by using a pre-computed table for all A5/1 encryption hashes. This 
work allowed the real time decode of all GSM calls on a nearby base station in 
real time (Info Security magazne, Dec 2009).  
Clearly the potential for intercept and modification of data running CNI such as 
TETRA and the ERTMS systems is highly worrying and leaves questions open 
as to how the cyber security of these systems have been penetration tested or 
analysed against well published attack vectors. As stated previously in this paper, 
these attacks are well documented and are available to malicious actors that 
possess the technical credibility of ‘script kiddies’. 
3.4.1.2 Wi-Fi Vulnerability 
In theory any wireless communication systems that can be de-modulated can be 
subject to this technical intercept. WiFi networks based upon 802.11abg are 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The 
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vulnerable to the cracking of Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP), Wifi Protected 
Access (WPA) and WPA 2 link layer encryption (Tsitroulis, et al., 2014).  
In 2004 the Aircrack Wi-Fi password cracking suite was released, which allows 
the recovery of cryptographic keys from WEP and WPA-PSK secured Wi-Fi 
networks. This attack was generated, based upon a variety of techniques such 
as dictionary attacks, and Stream Cypher attacks (Stubblefield, 2001) (Flugrer, 
Mantin and Shamir (FMS)). 
(Martin Beck, 2008) (Founder of Aircrack) demonstrated within his paper 
vulnerabilities within the WPA protocol. This paper explored a dictionary attack 
when a weak pre shared key (PSK) is used. The attack works if the network is 
using TKIP to encrypt the traffic. An attacker, who has about 12-15 minutes 
access to the network is then able to decrypt an ARP request or response and 
send 7 packets with custom content to the network. This shows obvious 
weakness in a previous thought to be secure protocol.  
These examples of intercept, cracking of link layer encryption illustrates a 
requirement for protecting the wireless network from demodulation by a third 
party. (Katabi, 2010) explores a protection scheme for OFDM based wireless 
communications that prevents an unauthorised third party from de-modulating 
the signal of interest whilst maintaining a practical wireless channel. This is 
applicable to OFDM modulation schemes that are widely adopted by WiFI, WiMA, 
LTE and several commercial MANET implementations, potentially preventing 
previously mentioned attacks against WEP and WPA from taking place. 
3.4.1.3 Distributed Intercept  
For Defcon 21, Brendon O’Connor presented a distributed sensor network that 
combines wireless network intercept, distributed command and control along with 
a 3D Visualisation engine in order to demonstrate the ability to track people. This 
presentation demonstrated that with access to the packet header data (not 
encrypted payload) various aspects of the victim’s device can be interpreted in 
order to either geographically tack between locations or to launch more detailed 
attacks against known vulnerabilities. Given that SDR with aforementioned attack 
programmes against the likes of GSM, TETRA, et al, it would be relatively easy 
to deploy a distributed attack network within an urban environment that could 
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attack. Although only theoretical at this time, with up to 150Mhz bandwidth being 
available concurrent attacks could be conducted across large swaths of the 
electromagnetic spectrum, seemingly only limited by the processing power of the 
host computer and communication interface with the SDR.  
Although seemingly a step away from military scenarios, the vulnerabilities that 
have been explored are directly applicable to military devices and systems. For 
instance, Military radios such as Selex’s Personal Role Radio (PRR) are 
available via online resellers and could provide a test bed against which reverse 
engineering attacks could be researched and tested. Given the published data 
sheets by Selex it would be relatively straightforward to engineer an intercept. 
The link layer is based upon Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum Modulation 
(DSSM) transmitting at 2.4 GHz using CVSD to encode the voice traffic. The 
standard GNU Radio build includes all blocks required to intercept and decode 
the PRR. Given the lightweight nature and ease of use the PRR is a preferred 
medium of communication for the Dismounted Platoon and is used regularly as 
the prime radio network of the dismounted Platoon within the UK army. Further 
to this, modern radio solutions such as Persistent Systems MPU range of radios 
use standard 802.11 link layers that could be vulnerable to a decode and 
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3.4.1.4 Countering Intercept 
iJam provides a PHY layer technique that protects sensitive pre-amble and 
header packets which can be exploited. Operation iJam is designed to work 
collaboratively by randomly jamming a repeated handshake packet. Due to the 
synchronisation of the receiver it can initiate communications, however this is not 
evident to a third party intercept. The paper presents threats from the interception 
and demodulation of wireless signals by an unauthorised third party. This allows 
the exploit of password protection schemes such as WPA2-PSK from openly 
available toolsets such as Backtrack and Kali Linux.  The challenge is to inflict 
the jamming within an approach that is not susceptible to the detection of jammed 
bits from clean samples.  
The research implementation is relatively efficient allowing a 16-QAM receiver to 
deliver a 512bit key within 14ms. This can protect the two nonces used to 802.11 
WPA2-PSK passwords within 28ms.  
Based upon a test bed of 20 nodes, in Line of Sight and Non line of Sight 
configurations, iJam was shown to provide a practical implementation. This 
resulted in the eavesdropper BER being close to 50%. Testing between random 
node pairs resulted in BER as a function of Signal to Noise Ratio for the intended 
receiver to be similar with and without the presence of the self-jamming signal 
even when an eavesdropper is experiencing a BER of circa 50%. This technique 
shows promise and could provide the basis for link layer protection.  
(Katabi, 2010) presents a means to obscure the physical layer of a wireless 
transmission from eavesdropping within an OFDM system. This merits further 
investigation as it could provide a valid approach to prevent intercept of signals 
facilitating the analysis of low entropy packets and reverse engineering for 
signals intelligence purposes. This paper only targets the sensitive packets of a 
handshake process however the scheme could provide a platform to further this 
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3.4.2 Reactive jamming threat  
Jamming is technically the injection of noise signal into the wireless channel of 
an intentional receiver or transmitter. This is generally conducted in order to 
disrupt or deny the communications channel via the lowering of perceived Signal 
to Noise Ratio (SNR) at the receiver. Jamming is a widely used military technique 
in order to deny your enemies access to the Electromagnetic spectrum whilst 
attempting to maintain your own wireless communications. Previously these 
techniques required customised hardware and high speed ASIC devices.  
Published research (Jones, June 2012) presents a reactive jamming 
implementation that has an 8ns reaction time and provides the ability to jam WiFi 
and WiMAX protocols.  The reactive jammer is built upon a USRP N210 SDR 
along with GNU Radio framework to provide a low cost and open source starting 
point.  
The core of the design is a custom packet detector and jamming controller that 
is integrated within the Direct Digital Conversion (DDC) chain. The custom packet 
detector is comprised of a cross-correlator and an Energy Differentiator. The 
cross-correlator is used to differentiate protocol and relies on the use of preamble 
inference based upon low-entropy portions of incoming signals devised from the 
I and Q portions of the base band signal. This provides a confidence-weighted 
analysis that can be customised to detect different protocols through user-based 
configuration from a host controller.  The energy differentiator continuously 
compares the current energy level against the recent past in order to detect a 
rise or fall of RF energy. The energy differentiator provides a measure of channel 
occupancy if the cross-correlation coefficients are not available.  
This implementation with the FPGA allows the DSP to initiate a jamming 
response within 1 clock cycle of a detection trigger. With the embedded Xilinx 
FPGA running at 100MHz this results in an 80ns response time between packet 
detection and jamming response. This response time allows the jamming of 
specific pre-amble packets or critical elements of the channel synchronisation 
process from a commercially available hardware platform. It is, in theory, possible 
to jam an 802.11g packet prior to OFDM symbol reception by the intended 
recipient. Lab testing demonstrated successful jamming against standards 
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attacks aimed to reduce bandwidth through to attacks that denied access to the 
network under attack. 
Prior to the availability of commercial SDR platforms, the above performance 
would have only been available through the use of custom ASIC design, ensuring 
the implementation would be prohibitively expensive and only technically 
available to governmental or military organisations. In theory now a dedicated 
enthusiast could assemble this style of device within a home lab and generate 
an advanced threat device that would pose significant disruption if deployed in a 
malicious manner.  
It could be argued that jamming is becoming a threat and CNI based upon 
wireless networks should consider as a part of their baseline cyber risk 
assessment.  
3.4.3 Protocol Aware Jamming  
D.Nguyen et al (2014) presents a very credible approach to developing a protocol 
aware Reactive Jammer. Concepts within this paper could be used to generate 
a Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) jammer capability that is protocol 
re-active and extremely wide frequency bandwidth. In terms of threat technology, 
this paper demonstrates that further work is required to secure the physical layer 
of wireless communications to counter jamming and spoofing. Encryption only 
stops payload discovery and does not in itself prevent tampering with the data 
transfer process. The correlation and protocol ‘awareness’ could be a serious 
threat if deployed within a live environment. This would allow a threat actor to set 
the jamming to interfere with wireless connectivity, either injecting a low bit error 
rate, completely denying a link or behaviour that could emulate an erroneous link 
connectivity. 
3.4.4 Detection and diagnosis of Jamming 
(W.Xu, 2005) explores techniques for diagnosing the presence of an active 
jamming signal within an acceptable false alarm rate. The premise of the paper 
is that no signal measurement is capable of reliably classifying the presence of a 
malicious jamming signal. Therefore, a range of techniques is required in order 
to ensure consistency checking to remove ambiguity. Jamming signals have 
several attack vectors that range from Barrage (constant), Protocol (Deceptive), 
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on the protocol compliance and detection techniques needed to take into account 
this spread of signatures. 
Currently it is nearly impossible to determine whether the presence of an 
interferer is related to the presence of an intentional jamming or to a non-hostile 
in-band interferer. In order to build rugged wireless protocols it is necessary to 
diagnose and manage with the presence of a hostile jamming signal. The solution 
presented uses a blend of techniques that are able to (under laboratory 
conditions) diagnose the presence of the four classes of jammer. This technique 
was built from measuring the Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) and consistency 
checking using a heartbeat signal along with packet counting.  
The PDR technique is calculated from two points of view. The first is the 
transmitter, which keeps track of CRC packets. The second for the Receiver, 
which calculates PDR from the ratio of packets that pass CRC check vs packets 
received.  The premise is that since a jammer would degrade the channel quality 
surrounding a node, the detection of radio interference relies on determining 
whether the communication node can send or receive packets. Within this study 
PDR was shown to perform reliably to differentiate jamming from congestion 
within the network. However, by itself it doesn’t provide a reliable enough metric. 
Consistency checking was used within the study as a second metric to back up 
the PDR. This used a heartbeat to provide a stream of packets that could be 
measured for consistency. Each node exchanged a heartbeat signal with its 
neighbour. This traffic provides a baseline from which PDR can be measured. In 
the enhanced detector neighbours co-operatively exchange PDR measurements 
in order to determine whether the channel is jammed or not. The algorithm is 
based upon the assumption that if a neighbour has a high PDR value the 
interference or interruption in communications is not related to jamming. 
(W.Xu, 2005) describes an interesting method of differentiating between the 
presence of a jammer. From the limited testing, this paper shows promising 
results, along with an assumption that jammers that are not very effective at 
interfering with the network behaviours that would make the PDR measurement 
increasingly discriminatory. In theory this would make PDR a powerful 
measurement tool for detecting interferers.  Additional techniques based on 
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to the presented algorithm and may be worth further investigation for the 
application of frequency hopping. 
3.4.5 Circumventing Jamming Attacks 
The impact of jamming on a wireless network can be prevented in different ways. 
(J T Chiang, 2014) presents a paper that explores a code tree system for helping 
the physical layer of a wireless network to become resistant to jamming. This is 
simulated within a Fast Frequency Hopping Code Division Multiple Access (FH-
CDMA) waveform. Techniques such as FFH-CDMA prevent link layer access to 
third parties due to its spread spectrum characteristics and hopping behaviours.  
The notion of frequency hopping in radio systems was originally credited to Hedy 
Lamarr co-originator of the idea of spread spectrum transmission (Antheil 
George, 1942). She and her pianist were issued a patent for the technique during 
World War II. They discovered the technique using a player piano to control the 
frequency hops, and envisioned it as a way to provide secure communications 
during wartime. This technique was the basis for modern spread spectrum and 
frequency hopping techniques used in Bluetooth, COFDM, and CDMA.  
The premise of the paper is due to the susceptibility of wireless networks to 
jamming attacks. An upper layer (of the ISO network layer model) feedback can 
improve the lower layer performance in areas such as transmit control. A spread 
spectrum physical layer technique provides a reasonable amount of immunity to 
jamming due to a multitude of frequency bands the transmission is made on. The 
spreading or hopping pattern can be viewed as a secret key that enables a secure 
transfer of information. The use of these systems within a live environment can 
be limited if the spreading or hopping codes are fixed in nature and therefore able 
to be reverse engineered.  
The solution within the paper is to use a combination of FFH-CDMA, which allows 
the use of multiple hopping patterns (simultaneous transmit of multiple 
frequencies) that are coded via a binary tree structure, above the physical layer.  
In this approach each transmitter builds a balanced binary tree of randomly 
generated hopping patterns. The transmitter associates each legitimate receiver 
with a unique leaf in this binary tree, and gives this receiver the hopping patterns 
corresponding to that leaf and all ancestors of that leaf in the tree. During a 
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hopping pattern; specifically corresponding with the root of the tree. Once 
jamming has been detected the transmitter should avoid such hopping patterns 
in the future and instead use a different cover. 
This technique was tested within a MATLAB simulation, consisting of a base 
station, 20 normal users and between 0 and 10 jammers. From this simulation, it 
was shown that in the presence of jamming (without knowledge of the coding 
scheme) 100% of the packets were delivered by using only one hopping pattern.  
Within this simulation a measure of PDR was used to determine the presence of 
a jammer (see paper 3). This technique also scaled to delivering 90% of packets 
in the presence of between 6 and 10 jammers, even when knowledge of the code 
use is gained by the jammers. 
(J T Chiang, 2014) look at a promising technique for the protection of the physical 
layer. With the complexity imposed by the coding technique coupled with the 
FFH-CDMA, a reliably secure communication exchange could be constructed. 
This needs to be evaluated in system testing in order to ensure the practicability 
of the implementation along with management of the coding tree. 
3.5 Meaconing Attack 
3.5.1 Background 
Electronic attacks against radio navigation systems has occurred over many 
years. During World War 2 with the Meacon long wave jamming station (Hepcke, 
1999) used to deceive German Fighters and Bombers approaching the UK coast 
line. With the rise of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) the Masking 
Beacon or Meaconing attack against in secure and ubiquitous navigation 
systems could be identified as a significant threat to modern CNI.  
A significant amount of national infrastructure and critical systems rely on GNSS 
as either a timing source or as a source of high precision positional data. The 
ability for an assailant to spoof GNSS and cause disruption as opposed to 
Jamming has been assessed previously as having either a low, medium or 
complex attack vector (Todd E Humpherys, 2008) dependant on whether the 
assailant makes use of multiple spoofers to simulate a distributed satellite 
constellation, a simple record and replay attack, or a gradual takeover of a victims 
signal lock. (Rugamer, 2015) shows there are commercial GPS spoofing systems 
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for a few thousand dollars or commercial GNSS RF-Signal Generators that cost 
upwards of $100,000 that could be used, although the cost of these systems 
could be seen as prohibitive to be considered as a wide spread threat vector.  
3.5.2 Attack Generation 
Significant work in the generation and demonstration of spoofing attacks against 
live platforms has been conducted by the Researchers within the Radio 
Navigation Laboratory for the University of Austin, Texas. (Todd E Humpherys, 
2008) demonstrates the creation and use of an off the shelf GPS spoofer and its 
use against Smart Grid, UAV and a Yacht in live scenarios (Daniel P Shepard, 
2012). Within these demonstrations it is shown how Meaconing attacks can be 
conducted in a straightforward manner without the intended victim being aware. 
The same attacks could be conducted using relatively low cost SDR platforms, 
further reducing the cost and complexity of successfully conducting Meaconing 
attacks.  
Elementary Internet searches have led to finding several research and open 
source implementations for GPS spoofers via the use of generic SDR platforms. 
(Olson, 2015) (RTL-SDR.com, 2015) both sources provide synopsis of research 
conducted by Lin Huang from Qihoo 360, producing GPS spoofing in order to fly 
a UAV within restricted airspace. This vulnerability allowed the team to 
circumvent the GPS ‘fencing’ that restricts commercial UAV’s from operating 
within restricted airspace. The software enabling the spoofing attacks is available 
on Git Hub (Ebinuma, 2015) and appears to compile and function. Section 4 will 
explore this software and whether this provides effectively a low cost, low 
technical approach to providing a GPS spoofing threat.  
Meaconing attacks have been conducted within recent memory against Military 
targets, the most recently and widely publicised example is the downing of a US 
RQ-170 by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards. It is believed that this was achieved 
through the jamming of the UAV control channels and produced a Meaconing 
attack to force the UAV to conduct a landing within a ‘safe’ environment (Christian 
Science Monitor , 2011).  
3.5.3 Countering Meaconing 
Given that Meaconing is a well-documented vulnerability with GNSS, significant 
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through augmenting GNSS receivers with anti-spoof algorithms and behaviours. 
A range of techniques exist and have been found to provide countermeasures 
against spoofing. Specifically (Mark L Psiaki, 2011) explores the viability of using 
the M-Code scrambled signal to cross-correlate the Civillian C/A code. In the 
study this approach was shown to be promising and provides a reliable way of 
detecting the presence of a spoofed signal. Even with the positive results it has 
been indicated that a Meaconing attack with enough RF bandwidth could defeat 
this anti-spoof mechanism. Further to this (Daniel Marnach, 2013) indicates that 
the analysis of receiver clock bias could be used to generate an anti-spoof 
algorithm, exploiting the inaccuracies present in GPS receiver real time clocks, 
when compared to the atomic clock sources within the GPS constellation. This 
research has shown good promise and showed repeatable results within lab 
testing. However further characterisation work is required against scenarios other 
than a simple record and replay attack. Again, further to clock bias and cross 
correlation (Ali Broumandan, 2012) explores the ability to use special correlation 
to detect spoofing attacks. This is based upon the hypothesis that a spoofing 
attack will originate from a single point of origin, allowing an algorithm to 
characterise the spatial information from a real GNSS constellation and therefore 
identify a Meaconing attack. Experimental results have shown that this spatial 
methodology has again good promise in detecting and protecting against 
spoofing attacks. Indeed, the published scientific literature has enough different 
approaches that there seems to be little to add to the subject area. However, 
through exploration of GPS sub-systems and System on Chip (SoC) suppliers, 
there seems to be little information of the actual implementation of anti-spoofing 
measures. 
Thiel’s (Andreas Thiel, 2009) white paper released by u-blox, who’s GPS SoC’s 
appear in a wide variety of applications, from simple developer kits for hobbyists, 
through to integration into high accuracy GPS solutions for Defence, Automotive 
and other industries. The white paper and marketing material released by u-blox 
indicates some internal protection against jamming, but does not indicate any 
protection against spoofing. Indeed, a further exploration of other suppliers, 
noticeably Novatel, Trimble and Garmin include no anti-spoof information with 
regard to their GPS solutions for automotive, naval or aircraft. Novatel have an 
active antenna technology, based upon beam forming and steering, however this 




Page 38 of 71 
3.5.4 Impact 
The use of civilian GPS receivers for military use is becoming common practice, 
due to the rapid development of civilian computing technology and the reduced 
Size, Weight and Power consumption. For instance, the Garmin Fortrex 401 has 
been a commonly used personal GPS receiver for use by Dismounted Soldiers 
to create ‘honesty’ traces of their patrols or for reporting position data for routes, 
areas of interest etc. It is unknown whether any anti-spoof or anti-jam analysis 
has been conducted, however due to the commercial availability of these devices 
it is highly unlikely14, therefore allowing spread of vulnerabilities, increasing the 
ability of malicious actors to conduct Meaconing attacks.  
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3.6 Conclusions 
The systematic threat survey has indicated the SDR can provide a very flexible 
platform that can be used for a variety of Cyber-attack scenarios, representing 
several threat vectors that can be launched from a single hardware platform. 
Commercially available SDR platforms such as the Hack RF and the USRP can 
present a threat in the 3 sub-categories of Electronic Attack; 
 Intercept 
 Jamming 
 Packet Injection  
Prior to the advent of these commercial SDR platforms the threat vectors as 
presented within the literature review would have required costly, highly 
specialised equipment along with deep RF expertise. Instead now, along with 
democratisation of information via the Internet, complex attacks against TETRA, 
GSM, GPS are achievable by ‘Script Kiddies’ and pose a wider risk than 
previously considered. Table 2 provides a summary of the vulnerably vs the 
mechanisms against the protocols covered by this literature review. 
 
 Threat Vector 
Compromised 
Protocol Intercept  Jamming Spoofing 
TETRA x x   
GSM x x   
GSM-R x x   
Mode S IFF x     
AIS x   x 
ACARS x   x 
Wi-Fi x x   
GPS    x x 
Table 2 Summary of protocol vulnerabilities identified in Literature review 
As military communication adopts a more commercial based architecture, the 
security of these waveforms and modulation techniques require deeper analysis. 
In contrast the commercial use of these waveforms and protocols need protection 
from Intercept as the EW threat that used to be confined to nation state actors, 
such as Intelligence or Military units, is now available to hobbyists and hackers 
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4 METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
Based upon the threats identified within the systematic threat survey, an 
experimental threat enumeration was used to understand the ease of exploitation 
for two of the identified vectors. This is based upon commercially available 
technology and open source software in order to understand the lowest common 
denominator in terms of threat actor. 
4.2 Research objectives 
The rapid evolution of radio technology into the Software Defined era, has 
accelerated the availability of advanced radio receivers that can cover very large 
portions of the radio spectrum (70MHz to 6GHz) at low cost. Coupled with the 
democratisation of knowledge that has occurred through the Internet, the threat 
environment for EW has changed markedly over the last 5 years. Previously EW 
threat would have arisen from a state actor that could fund the expensive 
equipment and antenna arrays that would be required for the intercept and 
disruption of military signals activities. The objective of this research will be to 
conduct some threat exploration, taking a commercial SDR platform and using it 
to conduct cyber-attacks against test subjects in controlled conditions.  
As the literature survey has indicated, security tends to be focused on the 
encryption of the payload using techniques such as AES-256. Strong encryption 
techniques such as Enigma and AES-256 have suffered from vulnerabilities due 
to mistakes in the development or through the mistakes of users.  
The objectives of this experimentation is twofold; 
1) Explore practical record and replay attack against a products communication 
system within controlled circumstances 
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4.3 Context and Constraints 
This research has been conducted without access to MOD agencies and 
information. The background information and MOD specific elements of 
information has come from open sources and direct professional experience of 
working within the Defence Communications industry. 
The UK MOD Independent Research and Development arm, Dstl was contacted 
at the beginning of this research in order to engage over threat information or to 
collaborate on research aims.  
As Dstl did not collaborate within this research, targets were procured where 
possible from sources such as Ebay. 
4.4 Test Bed Setup  
The test bed was designed to replicate the capabilities of a typical hacker. This 
was based upon the use of an off the shelf SDR platform integrated with a 
computer in order to provide the processing and human machine interface.  
 
Figure 7 - Test Bed Architecture 
Figure 7 illustrates the setup of the testbed. For this study, a Dell Precision T3600 
with Ubuntu 14.04 was used as the host computer to provide sufficient RAM and 
processing resources. Ubuntu provides a software operating system that already 
has a large amount of open source SDR solutions that can be implemented. The 
operating system uses the Ettus Research Universal Hardware Driver (UHD) as 
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product line integrates to software control applications through a common API 
set.  
To implement the radio component design and signals analysis, GNU radio15 was 
used. GNU radio is a framework of tools that interface C++ signal processing 
libraries that are implementations of common signal processing functions (such 
as FFT, Demodulators etc.) and interface them to a python module that provides 
a graphical interface in order to implement the executable code. Wireless 
exploitation scripts are written either through the use of the GNU radio visual 
flowchart. Gnu Radio also supports the writing of Python scripts which execute 
high speed Digital Signal Processing functions that are written and executed in 
C++ to allow rapid execution of complex DSP functions.  
In order to ensure compliance to UK legal obligations for the transmission of 
wireless signals, all experimentation will be conducted through a cabled RF 
environment. For experiments involving open air transmission, a valid test site 
license would be required from OFCOM. Due to the targeted systems, the 
timeline for this license process fell outside of what would have been acceptable 
for this study. The cabled environment ensures that all transmitter and receiver 
equipment is connected by coaxial cable and does not broadcast interfering 
signals that could interfere with licensed operators. In order to ensure the system 
does not receive damage from saturated receivers, inline attenuators have been 
used to ensure the signal received in consummate with an open air transmission.  
4.4.1 SDR platform Choice 
For the research conducted a USRP B210 was purchased to act as a threat 
source, providing a typically available SDR platform. The B210 platform is based 
upon the Analogue Devices AD9631, which is an Integrated Radio Frequency 
Integrated Circuit (RFIC). This device provides continuous coverage of between 
70MHz through to 6GHz, whilst allowing an instantaneous bandwidth of 56MHz 
sitting behind the RFIC is a Xilinx Spartan 6 Field Programmable Gate Array 
(FPGA) that provides a host processing capability that conducts the Digital Signal 
Processing (DSP) tasks of the SDR.  
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Figure 8 - Ettus Research B210 
The B210 is provided with a USB 3 interface for connection to a host computer. 
This interface provides the digital IQ connection to a host processor for de-
modulation and processing the baseband signals. The USB3 connection ensures 
the full 61 MS/s sample rate is available to application code executing on the host 
processor.  
4.5 Attack Impact Assessment  
The experimental strategy selected was to carry out a threat evaluation based 
upon an impact assessment of two specific attacks. The aim was to replicate 
several threat vectors within a laboratory environment and to measure their 
efficiency of affecting the target system and their credibility.  
Based upon the literature review and availability of victim equipment, the 
following threat vectors were chosen to be explored,  
4.5.1 Record and Replay Attack  
Within this scenario a threat actor uses a SDR capability to cause confusion or 
disruption to a communications system via recording the local Electromagnetic 
environment and replaying it. This allows the threat actor to re-transmit the 
original signals with the aim of either causing confusion through spurious 
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Figure 9 - record and replay attack 
This attack takes advantage of the lack of signal validation within wireless 
networks in order to replay the original received signal in order to implement a 
spoofing signal. If implemented within a crude manner this would present 
confusion to an operator of a system as they would experience repeating 
transmissions and potentially a blocked radio channel if they are operating a 
simplex transceiver that can only transmit with an unoccupied radio channel.  
This attack takes advantage of the wide bandwidth and processing capabilities 
of the SDR in order to record the raw baseband signals and to re-transmit them 
without the requirement to demodulate and to understand the signal of interest.  
This attack vector will be assessed against the ability for the SDR to inflict a valid 
signal on the threat system, resulting in spoofed receiver behaviour. The B210 
SDR platform will be used as the third party spoofer as illustrated in Figure 9. 
This experiment was based upon a theoretical scenario, where an adversary 
uses a wideband SDR platform to conduct a record and replay attack against a 
communications system. In theory this scenario could be extended to multiple 
spoofers to produce a distributed attack, leading to a much wider of area over 
which the effect can be sustained. 
This scenario uses the assumption that the adversary has no direct knowledge 
of the modulation scheme in question and is looking to create disruption as 
opposed to confusion arising from spoofed information.  
The threat target in this scenario is the Selex Personnel Role Radio (PRR) this 
radio provides the communications for the UK Dismounted Infantry at below 
Platoon formation.   A Platoon is a military unit typically composed of three 
sections and containing about 30 soldiers. Platoons are organised into a 
Company, which typically consists of three Platoons. A Platoon is typically the 
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usually a Lieutenant. He is usually assisted by a senior Non-Commissioned 
Officer; the Platoon Sergeant. In this scenario the PRR is used as the military 
unit requires voice communication over a relatively short range (less than a 
Kilometre).  
The PRR is used by the British Army, Royal Marines, Royal Navy and the Royal 
Air Force Regiment. The radio has a designed range of 500 meters, weighs 1.5 
kilogram and has 256 different radio channels.  
The PRR was originally part of the wider Bowman radio project but the 
procurement was accelerated and the first of 45,000 units formally entered 
service in early 2002. Operating in the 2.4 GHz band, PRR has no integrated 
encryption devices and does not intercommunicate with the rest of the Bowman 
network, but is widely acclaimed as having revolutionised intra-squad 
communications and small-unit tactics. 
The radio operates on spread spectrum and has been designed to have a good 
level of security, being designed with LPI.  
 
Figure 10 - Bowman PRR 
4.5.2 Network Spoofing (Meaconing Attack) 
The second scenario is of a Meaconing Attack, where the SDR is used to spoof 
a navigation signal for nefarious means. The navigation system used within this 
study is the Global Positioning System (GPS). Given the reliance on GPS, the 
ability to produce a GPS spoofer from open source software and hardware would 
have worrying implications. 
The second experiment conducted was a Meaconing attack against a 
commercial GPS receiver. This attack took advantage of Open Source software 
found during the literature review phase of this thesis (Literature review section 
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SDR-SIM generates GPS baseband signal data streams, which can be converted 
to RF using software-defined radio (SDR) platforms. 
The aim of the experiment was to understand whether the open source software 
would allow a valid GPS Spoofer to be built and execute attacks against 
commercial GPS receivers. 
 
Figure 11 - GPS Spoofing Diagram 
This attack functions by over powering the relatively weak GPS signal with a 
replacement signal. The replacement signal is constructed from true GPS 
constellation data and therefore should be detected as a valid GPS signal by the 
receiver. This attack is based upon software that has been published to Github 
under MIT license. The hypothesis being, is there software available freely that 
could provide a serious vulnerability to GPS using SDR?  
GPS-SDR-SIM uses a user’s defined waypoint information or static location to 
construct a dynamic model of position. This model is then parsed along with the 
daily GPS broadcast ephemeris file. This data is then parse by GPS-SDR-SIM to 
generate the simulated pseudo range and Doppler drift for the GPS satellites in 
view. This simulated range data is then used to generate the digitised I/Q 
samples which are fed to the SDR platform.  
This attack will be assessed against the ability of the spoofer to enable the GPS 
receiver to resolve a position or valid time. This will also be assessed against the 
ability of the GPS receiver to report valid GPS satellites within view and their 
respective Signal to Noise Ratios.  
4.6 Conclusion  
The methodology chosen is able to take advantage of commercially available 
hardware and open source software to potentially attack a radio that is in daily 
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concerning. The freely available radio from ebay would allow a prospective 
attacker to research the device in advance of any targeted attack, increasing the 
probability of its success. 
The SDR platform used as a basis of the test bed is flexible, allowing it to be re-
rolled from one format of attack to another. This allows the testbed to use a single 
SDR platform to target multiple wireless systems for vulnerability testing. 
The availability of GPS spoofing software as freely available software is an 
interesting development; in practice this could be used to execute distributed 
GPS denial or spoofing over large areas when combined with relatively cheap 
SDR platforms.  When matched with the ability for a relatively novice person to 
construct this platform, demonstrates that an Electronic Warfare threat is no 
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5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
The testbed was constructed and used against the attacks as defined within 
section 4. This section covers in detail the attacks conducted and the respective 
results.  
5.2 Record and Reply Attack  
5.2.1 Test Setup. 
In order to generate the record and replay attack, a cabled RF architecture was 
used in order ensure no transmitted RF would interfere with other systems. Given 
the transmit frequency of 2.4GHz, it was a possibility that the PRR and the RF 
attack would interfere with local WiFi services. Figure 12 illustrates the 
architecture of the setup. Each PRR was attached to a leg of a 3-way RF splitter, 
with the B210 SDR attached to a 20dBi Attenuator and then the splitter. This was 
conducted to ensure the radio front end of the SDR or the PRR’s would not 
receive damaging levels of RF energy whilst under test. 
 
 
Figure 12 - Record and Replay test architecture 
5.2.2 Results 
The first stage was to use the test bed to identify the transmit frequency of the 
PRR, identifying the basic characteristics of the waveform and to identify the 
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, 2013) for the PRR identifies the fundamental allocation as being at 2.4 GHz, 
from this information it was relatively easy to identify and measure the waveform 
as shown in Figure 13. For this exercise a relatively high sampling rate of 30MHz 
was used in order to capture the waveform with enhanced resolution, enabling 
the waveform to be clearly identified. From these measurements, Table 3 was 
constructed, which documents the measured channel allocation frequencies. 
From this measurement the channel spacing for the PRR is evidently 5MHz. In 
accordance with Nyquist Sampling theory: the sample rate for any record and 
replay should be twice or larger than the bandwidth of the signal in order to 
reduce the incidence of aliasing and distortion of the original signal. In the case 
of the PRR the minimum sampling rate should be in the magnitude of 10MHz. 
Table 3 - PRR channel to frequency allocation 
Identified Channel Number  Measured Frequency 
Channel 1 2.40159 GHz 
Channel 2 2.40659 GHz 
Channel 3 2.41159 GHz 
Channel 4 2.41659 GHz 
Channel 5 2.42159 GHz 
Channel 6 2.42659 GHz 
Channel 7 2.43159 GHz 
Channel 8 2.43659 GHz 
Channel 9 2.44159 GHz 
Channel 10 2.44659 GHz 
Channel 11 2.45159 GHz 
Channel 12 2.45659 GHz 
Channel 13 2.46159 GHz 
Channel 14 2.46659 GHz 
Channel 15 2.47159 GHz 
Channel 16 2.47659 GHz 
The PRR implements a digital modulation and voice encoding scheme. 
According to the manufacturers data sheet this is based upon the Direct 
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) technique, this is confirmed by the ‘bell’ 
shape that the signal possesses. As a result, it should be possible to decode this 
signal using a custom built DSSS recovery and demodulation scheme within 
GNU Radio, however this experiment is centred around a simple record and 
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Figure 13 - PRR Waveform captured by simple FFT 
Once the fundamental waveform had been found, a simple record and replay 
attack could be constructed with the test bed. In order to conduct this attack, the 
raw RF channel will be recorded to the computer hard disk and used to buffer the 
raw IQ samples for replay. Due to the raw nature of this, along with the relatively 
high sample rate of 10Mhz, the replay files will be of considerable size (files used 
as part of this experiment were in excess of 700Mb for circa 30 seconds 
recording). During our experiment, file sizes of between 700 and 1.2GHz were 
common for recordings of less than 30 seconds, indicating the high resolution of 
the IQ data that was being captured. Figure 14 illustrates the simple flow chart 
used for the capture of the RF signal, as can be seen GNU radio only requires 
two fundamental code blocks to implement this attack, namely the USRP source 
(SDR API interface) and the File Sink for recording to hard disk. The FFT sink 
was added to verify the quality and presence of the signal received, but formed 
no part of the recording process.  
 
Figure 14 - GNU radio Flow chart for RF capture 
Key 
--- PRR Captured Signal 
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The replay attack is conducted by feeding the raw IQ recording to the SDR for 
re-transmission. Due to the 50MHz bandwidth of the test bed, recreating the 
5MHz bandwidth signal is straight forward. The DSSS signal implemented within 
the PRR contains no verification mechanism, therefore once the test bed starts 
to transmit the signal, it should be received and de-coded by the PRR.  Figure 15 
illustrates the flow chart used for replay of the signal. As can be seen only two 
code blocks form the fundamental attack configuration, the File Source block 
which feeds the raw IQ data to the UHD sink block which transmits the raw IQ 
data to the SDR for conversion in RF for transmission. 
 
Figure 15 - GNU radio flow chart for RF replay 
The execution of this resulted in the recorded signal being replayed and both 
PRR’s emitting the audio recorded from the intercept, indicating this experiment 
has been a success. This demonstrated the signal was still recognised as valid 
and audible. Clearly no authentication of the signal or source device is used, 
allowing any third party to transmit a valid signal to these radios.  
The original and replayed signal had been verified by checking the waveforms, 
captured by the SDR and shown in  
Figure 16: as can be seen; some distortion of the waveform has been introduced 
as part of the record and replay process, however it is still recognisable and still 
provides a valid attack waveform for this scenario.  
Key 
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Figure 16 – Waveform during replay 
Whilst the intercepted signal is being replayed, the PRR does not allow transmit 
to occur due to the RF channel being occupied, effectively this places the radio 
into a situation where a Denial of Service (DOS) attack is occurring. If this 
occurred within a military scenario, this simplistic attack would be countered via 
the use of an alternative radio channel selection. With further development, it 
would be possible to construct a relatively efficient energy detector algorithm to 
identify the occupied channel, record a pre-determined amount of that active 
channel and then to constantly replay that sample. In theory this would deny the 
use of all 16 potential channels as the SDR would be conducting a dynamic DOS 
against any valid transmission.  
5.2.3 Discussion  
This experiment has demonstrated that a rudimentary attack is possible for a very 
low skill level. There is no knowledge required of the fundamental underlying 
radio technology in order to disrupt and to confuse the transmissions, instead just 
the ability to identify a valid signal within a portion of the radio spectrum. Although 
this attack was conducted against a pair of radios used for voice communication, 
the literature also indicates that this is possible against GNSS systems. 
This has been published (Jian Chen, 2013) where GNSS was spoofed via the 
recording and replay of a GPS signal. This paper showed it was possible to 
Key 
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generate a valid GPS signal, causing the receiver to display false position and 
timing data.  
Clearly the ease in which these attacks is generated, along with the relatively low 
cost of equipment may lead this to be a credible threat against military and civilian 
infrastructure alike. This vector allows the attacker to generate legitimate signals, 
of which there is no validation conducted by the receiver. In systems such as 
HAVEQUICK II, a valid link is only ever established when pre-conditions for all 
users are met. In the case of HAVEQUICK, this is in the format of a pre-shared 
frequency list, which determines the order and speed in which frequencies are 
shifted during the transmission cycle. In theory this would stop a record and 
replay attack because the radio signal being replayed would have to line up with 
the skip pattern of the original signal to be decoded. Alternative mechanisms 
such as (Katabi, 2010) would enhance this as the additional noise being 
generated in band would obscure the original transmission.  
5.3 Meaconing Attack  
5.3.1 Test Setup  
The second experiment conducted was a Meaconing attack against a 
commercial GPS receiver. 
GPS-SDR-SIM was built using the instructions as supplied within the Readme 
file. The GPS-SDR-SIM application code was compiled using GCC on a Linux 
environment and built using the SDR interface code required to interface to the 
Ettus Research B210, in use on the test bed.  The executable code used is 
provided in Annex C. 
GPS-SDR-SIM generates GPS baseband signal data streams, which can be 
converted to RF using software-defined radio. To produce the GPS spoofing 
signal, the user specifies the GPS satellite constellation through a GPS broadcast 
ephemeris file. The daily GPS broadcast ephemeris16 file is a merge of the 
individual GPS site navigation files into one and published by NASA for precision 
                                               
16 GPS broadcast ephemerides are forecasted, predicted or extrapolated satellite orbits 
data which are transmitted from the satellite to the receiver in the navigation message. 
Because of the nature of the extrapolation, broadcast ephemerides do not have enough 
high qualities for precise applications. The predicted orbits are curve fitted to a set of 





Page 54 of 71 
navigation. These files can be downloaded directly from Nasa17. The ephemeris 
and GPS co-ordinates files are then used to generate the simulated pseudo 
range and doppler for the GPS satellites in view. This simulated range data is 
then used to generate the digitised I/Q samples for the GPS signal for parsing to 
the SDR platform. 
In order to legally test the utility of this code the following experiment was 
conducted within the confines of a RF shielded environment. This ensured the 
GPS spoofing signal would be contained and not propagated to interfere with 
in-service GPS receivers. Figure 17 shows the architecture of the test setup.  
 
Figure 17 – Test architecture 
A GPS test receiver subject was produced via integrating an off the shelf GPS 
daughter card that is equipped with a commercial UBlox receiver. This was 
interfaced to the Raspberry Pi’s serial interface, in order to provide the NMEA 
GPS stream to the GPS decoding software running on the Raspberry PI. The 
open source CGPS framework and API was used in order to parse and format 
the GPS streams into a User format that could be used to monitor the GPS 
spoofing signal. 
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Figure 18 - GPS receiver architecture 
The test setup placed the victim GPS receiver in the screened chamber along 
with an Omni-directional antenna, which was connected to the SDR platform for 
injecting the spoofing signal. This simulated the free space propagation loss and 
mixing that would occur between the spoofing source and victim receiver. During 
the experimentation it was important not to overload the input of the victim GPS 
receiver as GPS signals typically have a received signal strength of circa -
130dBM it was important not to present the victim receiver with a spoof signal 
that would saturate the GPS receiver. To further ensure this was the case 20dB 
of attenuation was provided in the SDR transmit line.  
During the experiment, the GPS reception was verified with a standard high gain 
GPS antenna which fed the signal to the Raspberry Pi, which used the CGPS 
client software to display position, time and individual satellite signal to noise 
ratio. For this experiment the signal to noise ratio along with the resolved position 
and time were monitored in order to identify the presence of the GPS spoofing 
signal. The spoofing signal was constructed using the ephemeris file and GPS 
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5.3.2 Results 
 
Figure 19 -RF shielded chamber with victim and spoofing antennas 
The USRP B210 SDR is capable of delivering a variable power output of between 
0 and 20 dBm. This translates to a maximum available power delivery of circa 
100mW. Initially the experiment was commenced with 20dBi of attenuation in line 
between the SDR and the Antenna. This ensured a signal level of circa 1mW was 
delivered to the GPS receiver. During the experimentation the transmit level was 
increased in increments of 5dBm, through the increase of transmit power whilst 
observing for an improvement in signal reception. 
These initial attempts did not result in any indicated signal reception at the GPS 
receiver. Due to the use of an antenna within the shielded chamber as opposed 
to direct injection via cable, it was decided to remove all attenuation and apply 
the full 150mW to the GPS receiver. At this point, the GPS receiver indicated a 
valid GPS constellation with the parameters as shown in Table 4. Unfortunately, 
at no point during the experiment did the receiver indicate a valid GPS lock for 
time or position, even though a valid constellation and satellite ID’s were being 
reported. It was not possible to identify whether this was due to saturation of the 
receiver or the construct of the GPS waveform. This error condition was validated 
with differing ephemeris files, sourced direct from the NASA website. With the 
differing ephemeris files, no difference in behaviour was observed with the victim 
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Figure 20 Comparison of Live GPS and Spoofer SNR values 
Figure 20 is the resultant comparison of received Signal to Noise ratio from the 
spoofing experiment along with results from data capture from the live GPS 
constellation. This was produced in order to identify what a normal SNR profile 
would be for a GPS constellation. From live capture, it can be seen that the 
spoofing profile is not producing enough SNR for the satellites in order for the 
receiver to generate a valid lock. The spoofer only seemingly managed a peak 
SNR of 27dB across all attempts, however for a live capture the SNR values were 
consistently above 30 and peaking at 50 on occasion.  
Table 4 CGPS output from Spoofing attack for GPS telemetry  
Channel PRN Azimuth Elevation Signal to Noise Ratio Spoofer 
0 2 301 39 27 
1 3 101 17 23 
2 5 284 6 23 
3 6 242 66 22 
4 7 160 25 23 
5 9 159 84 23 
6 16 69 2 23 
7 17 211 2 23 
8 23 64 49 23 
9 26 43 6 23 
10 30 180 1 22 
27
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Channel PRN Azimuth Elevation Signal to Noise Ratio Spoofer 
11 33 196 30 27 
In order to understand if there was a failure in the cabling or antennas, further 
experimentation was conducted via directly connecting the SDR to the GPS 
receiver.  
The GPS RF input was directly connected to the SDR using a Bias T to protect 
the SDR from +5V DC supply voltage for the GPS active antenna. Along with the 
Bias T, up to 60 dB’s of attenuation was added to simulate attenuation due to 
free space path loss. With this setup identical results were observed as was seen 
with the experimental setup within the screened environment, namely valid SNR 
for the satellites seen but no valid GPS lock witnessed.  
In order to verify if the GPS receiver was still functional and was not subject to 
damage, GPS lock was again obtained from the GPS constellation. Lock was 
obtained within 60 seconds of establishing connectivity, demonstrating the GPS 
receiver was still operable and able to show valid position and time. During this 
test it was noted that the valid GPS constellation showed an average SNR value 
of circa 53 dB, leaving a question as to why the spoofer was only providing a 
23dB SNR value.   
Further analysis is required to understand the composition of the GPS spoofing 
signal and why it was unable to provide a valid signal for the GPS receiver. 
Seemingly it appears to be a case of signal distortion or saturation. However, 
validation with a correctly calibrated spectrum analyser would be required to 
confirm this theory. Unfortunately, due to limitations with this experimental setup 
that was not available. This goes some way to answering the question that a GPS 
spoofer could be built and used from open source software, however this must 
be tempered with the caveat that it does not appear to be as straightforward as 
with the record and replay attack as described in section 4.5.1. 
5.3.3 Discussion 
This experiment has not explicitly demonstrated the success or failure of the 
software in question, due to further analysis of the signal being required. What it 
does indicate is the viability of the spoofer, due to the ability to generate valid 
SNR for the simulated GPS satellites. Given the same SDR and test bed 
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attack, it illustrates the diversity of attack vectors that could be generated from a 
very simple SDR configuration available as a commercial product.  
The ability to reverse engineer this constellation and doppler data from publically 
issued data seems to be of concern. GPS spoofing conducted by  (Todd E 
Humphreys, 2008) and (A.J. Kerns, 2014) against live targets such as yacht and 
Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV) indicate that it is technically feasible to engineer 
these forms of attacks using commercial hardware. Further to this, Qihoo 360 
(Olson, 2015) recently published papers where a similar GPS spoofing device 
was produced and used to fly an UAV in restricted zones. In these zones the 
UAV is designed to be disabled due to manufacturer designed geo fences, the 
spoofing enabled its successful operation. The GPS spoofer effectively moved 
the UAV out of these zones and allowed it to operate.  
GPS receivers may be able to protect against these forms of spoofing attack by 
using multiple sources of GNSS data. Since the launch of GLONASS and when 
Galileo comes into production, it may be feasible for a GPS receiver to receive 
GNSS positional data averaged over the 3 constellations (GPS, GLONASS and 
Galileo) if this is achievable it would allow the receiver to ignore incorrect or 
significantly divergent data from one of the three sources. Modern smart devices 
such as the Samsung Galaxy Note 2 are able to receive all of these GNSS 
sources, effectively enabling this to be implemented relatively simply. A rules 
based algorithm based upon three-way voting could be used to verify the 
sources. This methodology is used with high integrity, multilane avionic systems 
in order to reject data from a malfunctioning processor or algorithm when 
processing data or logic. As this style of voting mechanism is already cleared for 
high integrity functions, in theory a high integrity receiver could use this 
mechanism to claim resistance to a Meaconing attack.  
Aside from mitigation with the use of differential sources, again this is an example 
where some fundamental validation of signal source is required to secure these 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
6.1 Main Findings  
This thesis set out with a hypothesis that payload encryption is simply not enough 
to protect infrastructure delivered via a wireless means. Since the days of World 
War 2, the encrypted payloads of transmissions have been intercepted and 
decoded due to insufficiencies within the implementation of the encryption 
schemes. Early work surrounding the obscuration of wireless signals with 
techniques such as Frequency Hopping and Spread Spectrum appear to be 
losing applicability when matched against the abilities of the latest generations of 
SDR, enabling the demodulation of these signals with ease. The concept of 
secret key encryption in military communications could be adopted to secure the 
baseband transmissions (W.Xu, 2005) again present a code tree methodology 
that could be used to identify sources of interference. Further to this, iJam 
(Katabi, 2010) appears to offer a scheme of signal masking that may provide a 
solution to preventing the unauthorised demodulation of a signal. This technique 
uses frequency agile transmissions to mask the signal against jamming an 
intercept.  
Given the ubiquitous nature of modern digital transmission, and the threat from 
intercept and spoofing, more protection is required to prevent demodulation or 
even identification of these signals. Although encryption techniques such as 
ULTRA and SSL are technically very hard to crack under brute force attack, the 
common fact is that human imperfections in the implementation of that encryption 
has led to their vulnerabilities.  
This leads to a fundamental conclusion that the physical wireless signal requires 
a new technique to either mask it or to prevent a third party from being able to 
de-modulate it. There appears to be no lack of viable protection schemes within 
the literature. Instead seemingly what is required is a commercial drive to 
implement a new generation of wireless protocols, enabling secure exchanges 
of information. With vulnerabilities relating to the introduction to Vehicle to 
Infrastructure, Vehicle to Vehicle or simply ad-hoc connections, the requirement 
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Aside from civilian concerns, a fresh look at communications security for the 
Defence Domain is required. With the increased adoption of commercial 
modulation schemes protected via encrypted payloads it is recommended that 
further work is conducted to understand the feasibility of techniques such as iJam 
within a real demonstrable system.  
6.2 Future Work 
The threat enumeration undertaken used a very small portion of the test bed 
capabilities. Given further time it would be been possible to reverse engineer the 
PRR waveform, allowing the direct demodulation of the signal along with the 
ability to inject a reconstructed waveform into the unmodified victim radio. This 
could be assisted with development of automated analytical tools for GNU Radio, 
which could through the use of a look up library or through use of machine 
learning, identify the modulation schemes used by the victim and provide 
baseline settings to commence reverse engineering from.  
Given appropriate funding and permissions it could be recommended that a 
transportable version of the test bed is constructed which could be hosted within 
a car or minivan, allowing testing of wireless networks within test environments. 
This could be used in conjunction with Vehicle to Vehicle and Vehicle to 
Infrastructure test environments as well as against autonomous vehicles within 
controlled test environments. Further to the aforementioned enhancements, if 
clearance could be obtained for transmission in an open environment, 
experimentation could be conducted against an operating Dismounted Platoon, 
in order to understand the vulnerabilities of the PRR to these attacks whilst 
operating in context.  
The test bed constructed for the experimentation phase could be used as the 
basis as a wireless Cyber Vulnerability Investigation (CVI) capability, further 
research and development would be required to establish a tool framework that 
would enable use in line with products such as Kali Linux for network penetration 
testing. However, given wireless networks are not subjected to routing 
penetration testing when operational, such a CVI capability could be proven to 
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8  ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ACARS Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System 
AES  Advanced Encryption Standard 
AIS  Automatic Identification System 
API  Application Programming Interface 
ASIC  Application Specific Integrated Circuit 
BATCO  Battle Code 
BER  Bit Error Rate 
C4ISR  Command Control Communications Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
CCTV  Closed Circuit Television  
CDMA  Code Division Multiple Access 
C-IED  Counter Improvised Explosive Device 
CNI Critical National Infrastructure 
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check 
CVSD Continuously Variable Slope Delta Modulation 
DDC  Direct Digital Conversion 
DDOS Distributed Denial of Service 
DoD  Department of Defence  
DOS Denial of Service 
DSP  Digital Signal Processing 
DSSM  Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum Modulation 
DSTL  Defence Science and Technology Laboratory 
EO Electro Optic 
ERTMS European Rail Traffic Management System 
EW Electronic Warfare 
FFT  Fast Frequency Transform 
FPGA  Field Programmable Gate Array 
GNSS  Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
GPS Global Positioning System 
GSM  Global System Mobile 
IA Information Assurance 
IMSI  International Mobile Subscriber Identity 
IoT  Internet of Things 
IP Internet Protocol 
ISO  International Standards Organisation 
JTRS  Joint Tactical Radio System 
LPD  Low Probability of Detect 
LPI Low Probability of Intercept 
MANET Mobile Ad Hoc Network 
MOD  Ministry of Defence 
NEC  Network Enabled Capability 
NSA  National Security Agency 
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OSI Open Systems Interconnection 
PDR  Packet Delivery Ratio 
PHY Physical Interface 
PMR Personal Mobile Radio  
PRR Personal Role Radio  
PSK  Pre Shared Key 
RF Radio Frequency 
RFIC  Radio Frequency Integrated Circuit 
RPAS  Remotely Piloted Air System 
SDR Software Defined Radio 
SIGINT  Signals Intelligence 
SoC  System on Chip 
SoS System of Systems 
TKIP  Temporal Key Integrity Protocol 
UAV  Unmanned Air Vehicle 
UHD  Universal Hardware Driver 
UHF Ultra High Frequency 
UK  United Kingdom 
USRP  Universal Software Radio Peripheral  
V2I  Vehicle to Infrastructure 
V2V  Vehicle to Vehicle 
WEP  Wireless Equivalent Privacy 
WiMAX  Worldwide interoperability for Microwave Access 
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ANNEX C GPS-SDR-SIM APPLICATION CODE 
 
#!/usr/bin/env python 
# a small script to transmit simulated GPS samples via UHD 
# (C) 2015 by Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org> 
# Licensed under the MIT License (see LICENSE) 
 
from gnuradio import blocks 
from gnuradio import eng_notation 
from gnuradio import gr 
from gnuradio import uhd 
from gnuradio.eng_option import eng_option 
from gnuradio.filter import firdes 





    def __init__(self, options): 
        gr.top_block.__init__(self, "GPS-SDR-SIM") 
 
        ################################################## 
        # Blocks 
        ################################################## 
        self.uhd_usrp_sink = uhd.usrp_sink( 
         ",".join(("", "")), 
         uhd.stream_args( 
          cpu_format="fc32", 
          channels=range(1), 
         ), 
        ) 
        self.uhd_usrp_sink.set_samp_rate(options.sample_rate) 
        self.uhd_usrp_sink.set_center_freq(options.frequency, 0) 
        self.uhd_usrp_sink.set_gain(options.gain, 0) 
 
        # a file source for the file generated by the gps-sdr-sim 
        self.blocks_file_source = blocks.file_source(gr.sizeof_char*1, options.filename, True) 
 
        # convert from signed bytes to short 
        self.blocks_char_to_short = blocks.char_to_short(1) 
 
        # convert from interleaved short to complex values 
        self.blocks_interleaved_short_to_complex = blocks.interleaved_short_to_complex(False, False) 
 
        # establish the connections 
        self.connect((self.blocks_file_source, 0), (self.blocks_char_to_short, 0)) 
        self.connect((self.blocks_char_to_short, 0), (self.blocks_interleaved_short_to_complex, 0)) 
        self.connect((self.blocks_interleaved_short_to_complex, 0), (self.uhd_usrp_sink, 0)) 
 
def get_options(): 
    parser = OptionParser(option_class=eng_option) 
    parser.add_option("-x", "--gain", type="eng_float", default=0, 
                      help="set transmitter gain [default=0]") 
    parser.add_option("-f", "--frequency", type="eng_float", default=1575420000, 
                      help="set transmit frequency [default=1575420000]") 
    # On USRP2, the sample rate should lead to an even decimator 
    # based on the 100 MHz clock.  At 2.5 MHz, we end up with 40 
    parser.add_option("-s", "--sample-rate", type="eng_float", default=2500000, 
                      help="set sample rate [default=2500000]") 
    parser.add_option("-t", "--filename", type="string", default="gpssim.bin", 
                      help="set output file name [default=gpssim.bin]") 
 
    (options, args) = parser.parse_args() 
    if len(args) != 0: 
        parser.print_help() 
        raise SystemExit, 1 
 
    return (options) 
 
if __name__ == '__main__': 
    (options) = get_options() 
    tb = top_block(options) 
    tb.start() 
    raw_input('Press Enter to quit: ') 
    tb.stop() 
    tb.wait() 
  
